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SOME PRINCIPLES OF DECISION MAKING UNDER UNCERTAINTY
IN LONG-TERM TREATMENT SITUATIONS
Julius A. Roth
University of California, Davis
ABSTRACT
Comparative information from field notes of four
studies of long-term treatment institutions form the
basis for developing propositions about decisions made
under conditions of uncertainty. These propositions
fall under the general rubrics of decision making when
action involves danger, when decisions are made to
control clients' or subordinates' behavior, and when a
choice must be made between alternatives. The proposi-
tions are illustrated with examples taken from the
four studies.
In conducting a program of therapy and management
of inmates of long-term treatment institutions, the
staff is faced with many situations in which the effi-
cacy or outcome of their actions are highly uncertain.
Yet, they cannot avoid taking action so long as they
hold a given position in the institution. Even
putting off action is a decision with consequences for
the parties involved. This paper is an effort to
empirically develop some regularities or "principles"
of staff decision making in situations of uncertainty.
The information on which induction of these prin-
ciples of decision making is based is part of the
author's earlier studies of tuberculosis treatment and
management (Roth, 1963) and the conduct of a rehabili-
tation program for the physically disabled (Roth and
Eddy, 1967). To the bodies of observational field
notes from these two studies I later added detailed
ongoing field notes from two other studies in which I
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did not participate: An investigation of two psychi-
atric treatment programs by Anselm Strauss and his
associates (Strauss et al., 1964) and a study of
social rehabilitation of the inmates of two training
schools for delinquent youth conducted at the School
of Social Work, Columbia University. Note that, al-
though there are four studies involved, these repre-
sent field work undertakings of major proportions in
ten different institutions by nine senior researchers
plus a number of assistants.
Comparative studies using other people's work
typically rely on published writings as the source of
the comparative materials. The weakness of such
sources is that they represent authors' distillation
of a mass of information and explanatory possibilities.
In the process of distilling their information, much
of what they have learned must be ignored and that
which is utilized is framed in certain explanatory
schemes. Thus, in an observational field study, much
of the original information is lost. Having access to
such field notes means that a broader range and spec-
trum of information is available. Of course, even
field notes represent a selective perception of the
investigator's total experience, but not nearly as
restricted a selection as the published work. In
order to take advantage of the greater breadth of data
in original field notes to make my comparisons, I
limited my study to those bodies of research whose raw
notes were available to me.
In coding the field notes, I made use of analytic
characteristics which, from my previous experience and
reading, appeared to have useful explanatory value.
The procedure consisted of reading all the notes and
coding instances of staff decisions and actions in
situations of recognized uncertainty. (Other aspects
of these studies were coded at the same time.) The
various incidents were then compared with an eye to
finding similar patterns, especially across the dif-
ferent treatment programs. Although propositions
based on a series of examples constitute crude explana-
tory formulations, they can serve as generalizations
which may be tested on other bodies of detailed obser-
vational data.
The coding procedures and comparisons between
institutions produce a series of conditions and strate-
gies which typify the actions of the staff in dealing
with uncertainty. A simple listing of these condi-
tions and strategies has the virtue of keeping the
organization of generalizations close to the informa-
tion in the field not---a minimal leap from observa-
tional data to conclusions and thus more justifiable
for a preliminary examination.
The following propositions were developed in this
manner:
When action involves danger
1. When in doubt, play safe.
Those in charge of a treatment program usually
consider conservative treatment the safest path for
everyone concerned. Thus, if the patient is a border-
line case of tuberculosis, you treat him as if he had
tuberculosis. If it is a choice between a diagnosis
of tuberculosis and cancer, you treat him as if he had
cancer because that disease requires more urgent treat-
ment. If you are not sure about the effect that a
leave of absence from an institution may have on the
inmate, do not give him a leave. If you are not sure
how much rest is good for the patient, give him more
rest. If you are not sure whether it is safe to dis-
charge a person from an institution, keep him there
longer. If a patient is suspected of being suicidal,
keep him under strict observation and isolate him from
potentially injurious materials. Such observations
fit in with Scheff's notion of medical bias toward
pathology, but seen from a different perspective
(Scheff, 1963).
Of course, other forces, especially pressure from
the inmate, oppose this tendency and often modify it.
Also, there are some cases in which this principle of
giving more of a good thing is obviously not appli-
cable; for example, giving more than the optimal
amount of a medication may result in serious toxic
effects.
2. Immediate and well-known danger takes
precedence over a less certain and more
distant danger.
A good example of this principle is the contro-
versy about radiation hazard in X-ray diagnosis and
the extent to which X-ray screening for tuberculosis
and cancer should be curtailed to avoid this hazard.
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Most experts in clinical work believe that X-ray diag-
nosis should be continued on a large scale, including
the use of X-rays for screening and survey purposes.
They argue that they know that X-rays can uncover many
cases of tuberculosis, cancer, and other diseases and
are a valuable aid in evaluating treatment, whereas
the hazard from radiation is much less certain and in
any case is a danger which would affect our population
only some time in the future. This future and uncer-
tain danger appears much less frightening than the
more immediate and better-known danger of serious
diseases. In much the same way, the danger of vio-
lence by an inmate of a hospital or training school or
prison is usually considered more important to deal
with than the more remote and uncertain effects that
suppression of his aggressive behavior may have upon
his psyche and his relationships with others.
3. The greater the fear, the greater the
inconveniences which one is willing to go to
in order to reduce the danger.
A ready example here is hospital personnel
efforts to protect themselves against contagious
disease. New employees in tuberculosis hospitals had
a high level of fear of the disease and went to con-
siderable trouble to wear protective clothing and to
enforce the boundaries of contaminated and uncontami-
nated areas. After they had been employed for a
period of time, this fear decreased greatly and much
less care was taken to protect themselves. Protective
clothing continued to be worn when it did not entail
much trouble (such as one change of clothing to do an
hour or two of work), but was not worn when it repre-
sented relatively great inconvenience (changing
clothes for a task which took a minute or two). When
hospital personnel are caring for patients with a
disease that inspires great fear (e.g., gas gangrene),
the precautions taken are far more elaborate and incon-
venient than when they are taking care of other conta-
gious diseases which inspire less fear (e.g.,
measles).
Whenever there is potential danger in the care-
taking and treatment tasks, the response of the staff
may be conceived of as a balance between fear and in-
convenience. This balance lends itself to some degree
of managerial manipulation. Fear levels may be delib-
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erately heightened as a way of inducing compliance
with inconvenient protective procedures.
When decisions are made to control clients' or
subordinates' behavior, the control is more likely to
be exercised when:
4. The behavior is conspicuous.
Tuberculosis hospital personnel attempted to con-
trol the activities of the patients and enforce a
given amount of rest. In practice, they were most
likely to control or restrict those activities which
were most obvious to the casual observer and to over-
look those activities which blend into the background
of ward routine.
In the psychiatric hospital, personnel, especi-
ally students and new nurses, judge patients mainly by
their overt attention-getting acts, whereas if a ward
is "quiet," everything is assumed to be all right.
The patient who makes a "nuisance" of himself receives
the most attention, if only to develop plans to get
rid of him.
In the training schools, drunkenness and failure
to carry out assigned tasks are almost sure to be
noticed and to be punished. The more subtle and dis-
guised forms of aggression among inmates is often over-
looked.
5. The behavior can be objectively defined or
measured.
In-the tuberculosis hospital, patients cannot be
forced to rest by simply presenting them with a
general philosophy of the desirability of rest. How-
ever, rest can be enforced to some degree if it is
defined in terms of specific time periods when the
patient must be in bed. Control of recreational activ-
ities is another difficult matter for hospital staff.
They can control certain of such activities more pre-
cisely when they can define them in terms of occupa-
tional therapy materials which the patient uses or
time periods when card games or other games are
allowed or not allowed.
In the training school, social workers find treat-
ment plans difficult to define and objectify and thus
these plans are often subverted by the non-
professional cottage parents. The social workers some-
times attempt controls through administrative rulings
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wnich are easier to entorce. Thus, cottage parents
can be fired for drunkenness, for overt homosexuality,
for leaving the inmates unattended. They can also be
required to report any hitting of inmates and thus
account may be kept of one aspect of their discipli-
nary methods.
In psychiatric hospitals, nurses' notes tend to
concentrate on concrete events which are easy to mea-
sure; for example, the number of patients off the ward
for any reason, physical injuries and illnesses, trans-
fers, medications given, visitors, daily census.
There is little noted about the more subtle aspects of
patients' behavior. Nurses' aides want to know mainly
what privileges a patient is allowed; for example, who
is allowed off the ward, because they will then know
what specific behavior to watch for.
A failure to do the well-defined tasks are most
likely to get one into difficulty. Thus, a night
nurse is criticized for failure to copy doctors'
orders, order drugs, put labels on syringes. No com-
ment is made about how she interacts with patients
since this has not been directly observed and cannot
be defined or readily inferred from the outcome. In
the same way, nurses and psychiatric residents put
pressure on therapists for prescriptions on how they
should react to specific behavior of patients rather
than being told what general attitudes to take. Some
doctors' orders are more enforceable than others.
Thus, if the doctor orders a specific medicine, one
can complain to higher authorities if the medication
is not given. If the doctor orders "contact" with
patients, it is virtually unenforceable because it is
so difficult to define.
6. The end point of the control effort can be
comprehended.
This is another aspect of objective definition,
but in terms of a temporal definition. When staff
members can see that their control efforts will lead
to some kind of successful conclusion in a given
period of time, especially a relatively short period
of time, they are more likely to maintain the control
effort than if the end is indefinite or stretches out
into the distant future.
In tuberculosis treatment, there is an effort to
organize therapy in terms of specific time periods
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after which Drograss is aswssed, usually with an eye
to taking some definitive action, such as discharging
the patient from the program or placing him/her on a
different activity level. There are chemotherapy "pro-
tocols" with standardized dosages for standardized
time periods with patients' compliance closely moni-
tored. There is excisional surgery with standardized
stages of recuperation during which patient activities
are specified. Patients who are not on such definite
programs of therapy (usually because the therapy has
been tried and has not been successful) are given less
specific advice concerning activities and are less
closely monitored.
In the rehabilitation program, retraining with a
leg prosthesis was pursued by physical therapists in a
quite different manner for young people than with old
people. With the young it was assumed that functional
learning would take place quickly and would be com-
plete by a specified time measured in weeks. The
patients had a program of frequent training sessions
which they were held to strictly. In the case of
older people, both the time period and the outcome
were in doubt and the training was therefore not con-
sidered "worth" much effort. Training sessions were
more widely spaced and patients were less likely to be
pressured to participate if they wanted to be excused
from some sessions.
In the training schools, academic courses and
vocational training with definite end points had coer-
cive requirements for attendance and participation.
In contrast, "counseling"--where the time was open-
ended and the outcome uncertain--was typically pursued
in a haphazard manner, the scheduling of sessions
depending largely on what time the social workers felt
they could spare from more pressing (often better-
defined) duties.
7. Violations of the rules and procedures leave
tangible evidence of being obeyed or
disobeyed.
Nurses' aides in a hospital are more likely to do
those cleaning tasks where the result is readily
noticeable to those who supervise them and are less
likely to do those cleaning tasks where the results
are not likely to be noticed. In the psychiatric hos-
pital, the failure to give a medication order is
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easily detected, the giving of "personal contact" is
not, and therefore the latter is less likely to be
attended to. In the rehabilitation program, failure
to turn and massage spinal cord injury patients often
led to the development of decubiti ulcers which would
lead to criticism of the nursing staff by the physi-
cians. On the other hand, failure to deal with the
emotional upsets of patients by nurses would not evoke
such criticism unless there was some tangible outcome,
such as a suicide (even then the connection was not
likely to be made).
In the training schools, when the social workers
are short of time to do all of their work, they first
do those things which provide tangible evidence to
their supervisors--reports to the courts, reports to
supervisors, attending staff meetings. On the other
hand, they can more easily put off interviews with
inmates which leave no evidence or which will not come
to the attention of their superiors. Cottage parents
do not want to report discipline problems when they
can help it, but they must report those which leave
visible evidence; for example, bodily injury to the
inmates, damage to school property.
When a choice must be made between alternatives
8. Select that action whose effects are more
readily quantifiable.
This was already indicated in the discussion of
the control of patients' activities in tuberculosis
hospitals. There is a tendency to define patients'
activities in readily quantifiable terms, primarily in
terms of length of time in which certain activities
may be carried on or the time periods in which they
may be carried on. There is also some definition in
terms of materials used in these activities. In a
psychotherapy program, "contact" with patients may be
prescribed in terms of specific amounts of time to be
spent with patients and thus an effort made to define
the therapeutic relationship in readily measurable
quantities. This implies greater control over subordi-
nate staff activity than would prescriptions not based
on definite amounts of time.
The rehabilitation program too favors modalities
which can be readily quantified. Physical therapy is
measured in time periods of training sessions or in
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the repetition of specified exercises a given number
of times. Occupational therapy is measured in terms
of the products produced, social work in part through
counseling sessions of a given length of time at regu-
lar intervals.
9. Select the action whose effects can be more
sharply defined.
In tuberculosis diagnosis there has been a con-
stant press for sharper definition. For example, one
of the factors which made for uncertainty in inter-
preting the Manteaux skin test was the variability in
the manner in which the test material was injected
under the skin of the subject. Some tests developed
later attracted much initial attention because they
standardized the manner of injection.
In controlling the contagiousness of tuberculosis
in a hospital setting, it was easier to define solid
boundaries rather than air masses. Thus we found con-
tagion controls largely in terms of rooms, doors, and
floor territories even though this does not correspond
closely to the implications of research on the trans-
mission of the disease.
In psychiatric institutions we find that improve-
ments in hospital programs are often defined in terms
of reduction of the patient population. Nurses'
aides' definitions of the patient's condition is more
in terms of observable behavior than in terms of psy-
chiatric categories; for example, tidy versus untidy,
walking versus infirm, working versus idle. Ward per-
sonnel are more likely to take action with respect to
patients engaged in disruptive behavior where they can
bring about some obvious control of that behavior than
they are in the case of patients who are depressed
where they are much less likely to produce clearly-
defined results. The more immediate action for pos-
sible suicide is removing potential weapons rather
than concentration on bringing about changes in the
patient's self-perception.
10. Apply oneself to satisfy the more routine
scheduled demands first, the unusual or
irregular later.
We find ward personnel doing things like making
beds, taking temperatures, giving baths, and doing the
scheduled cleaning tasks first. Later, if they have
time, they may do some cleaning which is not regularly
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scheduled and may do certain favors for patients.
These latter tasks can be expanded or contracted rela-
tively freely, but the former ones must be done before
they go off duty and will get them into trouble if
they are not done.
In the training schools and in the rehabilitation
program social workers carry out their clerical rou-
tines and produce their written reports first. Coun-
seling and therapeutic interviews are done later if
there is time.
Hospital night nurses always make a point of get-
ting the paper work routines finished first; the non-
scheduled patient care work comes second. The day-
time nurse too tries to see that all of the routine
tasks are completed and concerns herself with personal
contact with the patients only insofar as time is left
for this.
11. If you must guess, be consistent in your
guesswork.
When you make some decisions concerning privi-
leges for patients when you have only a vague notion
of what the effect of your decisions will be, at least
follow a consistent pattern which applies to all
patients of a given category. Thus, in a given hospi-
tal, leaves of absence to patients in given categories
are of the same length and come with the same fre-
quency. The time from one reference point in a treat-
ment career to another is much the same for all
patients. Thus, the staff is relieved from arguing
the question of fairness as inmates compare experi-
ences with decisions of the staff.
Such consistency of decisions is even more impor-
tant in the training schools. There is a common
assumption that inconsistencies will be "taken advan-
tage of" if the decision varies from case to case.
Staff develop standard routines for decisions to use
when they are challenged.
In the chronic hospital settings medications for
the control and relief of subjective symptoms are also
likely to be standardized. Since prescribing for such
symptoms (usually under pressure from the patient
involves much guesswork concerning result on the part
of the physician, there is no reason to vary from case
to case (except as an empirical follow-up--if one medi-
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cation is not effective, try another or a different
dosage).
12. Put off choice and accumulate more evidence.
If there is uncertainty in diagnosis, try to re-
duce the uncertainty by piling up more evidence.
Thus, in a tuberculosis hospital, if several series of
sputum tests give contradictory results, give still
more tests with the hope that they will finally give a
consistent result. If chest X-rays and clinical signs
point to the possibility of either cancer or tuber-
culosis, give more tests which may be positive for one
or the other of these diseases and hope that they may
be differentiated. The same principle is served by
such practices as dual reading of X-rays in which it
is hoped that the pathology missed by one expert will
be picked up by another.
In the rehabilitation unit, when the staff could
not make up its mind about discharging a patient, they
would keep putting off the decision meeting after meet-
ing and accumulate more information and order more
patient evaluations. The hope was that the further
information would tip the balance in the direction of
a given discharge plan.
Generally speaking, an institutional staff member
faced with uncertainty first acts on the basis of such
a principle as those summarized above, and then
explains his action in terms of treatment technology,
professional ethics, or general moral values.
It would be useful to place the points made in
this paper in a more general context of making deci-
sions under uncertainty in a wider scope of human
activity. And of course, there are writings which
appear to use these same concepts (or at least some of
the same words). Similar questions have been posed in
the case of economic decisions and international power
strategies (Schelling 1960) and in diplomatic maneuver-
ing (Zartman 1977). It has also been the object of
psychological experimentation (Janis and Mann 1977).
The problem is, as I compared the institutional
data available to me with the published analyses refer-
red to above, I could detect no similar categories or
explanations. This may be a deficiency of synthesis
on my part and thus awaits the interest of someone
with greater capacity at such a task. It may mean
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that the empirical data in the several areas are of
such a different order that they are not comparable.
Or perhaps we have been led astray because the same
words and phrases are being used to describe quite
different phenomena.
Grand-scale comparisons aside, how else might one
proceed from here?
Most obviously, it would be possible to examine
other long-term treatment settings to see to what
extent and in what ways the decision behavior of staff
matches or does not match the propositions posed in
this paper. I would urge in such a case that the kind
of information be similar; that is, derived from inten-
sive observation over a period of time. Those invol-
ved in human services practices can draw materials
from their daily experience for this purpose.
To enlarge the scope of comparison, one might
examine other settings in which one group (institu-
tional staff, professionals, managers) exercise con-
trol over another group (inmates, clients, employees)
but where there is often considerable uncertainty
about the effect of decisions made by the controllers.
The farther one moves from the empirical settings con-
sidered in this paper, the more likely it is that
issues and propositions different from (not neces-
sarily contradictory to) the list I have posed will
appear.
At another step removed, one can examine arenas
which do not involve direct control over, or service
to, individuals in an organizational setting. But
then one is dealing with arenas such as broad economic
planning or international diplomacy where I have
already acknowledged failure to find links to the situ-
ations I am most familiar with. I therefore believe
such steps are best left to others.
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